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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
WAYNE N. MASON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
TOOELE CITY, a municipal
corporation,
Defendant and Respondent,

Case No. 12132

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Respondent concurs in the Statement of the nature
of the case, the disposition of it by the lower court and
the relief sought on appeal stated in appellant's brief.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
So the the court will have before it the contract here
involved and not merely conclusions as to what it contains
we quote said contract.
AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into this
1st day of February, 1962, by and between the. STATE
ROAD COMMISSION OF UTAH, hereinafter referred
to as the "Road Commission," and TOOELE CITY,

Utah, hereinafter referred to as the "City," and Tooele
County hereinafter referred to as the "County":
-WITNESSETH:
That in consideration of the mutual covenants and
agreements contained herein the parties hereto agree as
follows:
WHEREAS, there is currently in existence a Sewage
System and a Water System in the City of Tooele, and
there is now an area in whieh the City plans to develop facilities for utility maintenance, which will require
water and sewage outlets; and
WHEREAS, the State Highway Maintenance Area
and privately-mvned lands will require sewage and water
connections, in the aforementioned area; and
WHEREAS, the City does not have the required
funds to cover the original installation cost of an extension of the current systems to carry the water to meet
the future requirements of adjacent areas, and the immediate requirements of the State Highway Maintenance
Area; and
WHEREAS, the City currently has employed a contractor to work on the City's water and sewage systems,
and this said contractor has agreed to install1.

1168 ft. of eight and six inch sewer
.
at $3.00 per foot ----------------------------------------$3,504.00

2.

Two (2) 4-foot manholes at $250.00
each --------------------------------------------------------------

3.

Three (3) Cleanouts --------------------------------

500.00
65.50

4.

Thirteen ft. of 4" sewer line at $2.50
per foot --------------------------------------------------------

32.50

Total ___________________________________________________ .$-1-, 102.00

and,
WHEREAS, the Road Commission is desirous of
ha\'ing water and sewage facilities extended to the State
Highway Maintenance Area; and the City has equipment for digging and backfilling the trench for the water
line, and is willing to contribute this service for other
rnlues to be received;
IT IS HEREBY AGREED by and between the parties hereto as follows :
1. The Road Commission agrees to reimburse the
City of Tooele the sum of $4,102.00 covering the total cost
of the aforementioned contracted construction.
2. The Road Commission agrees to the extension of
the sewl').ge line in a southerly direction along Coleman
Street one thousand feet (1,000 ft.) to service the junction opposite the State Maintenance Area, using an 8inch size pipe, rather than the 6-inch minimum to enable
the City and adjacent City property owners to connect
to this sewer line at later dates. In this manner revenue
will be provided to defray the cost of this installation,
and in no way affect the services needed at the Maintenance Area.
3. The connection fee for connecting the Maintenance Area to the sewer line is approximately $577.00,
which will be paid by the Road Commission. This amount
dedncted from the total cost of $4,102.00 leaves a balance
of $3,525.00 which will be divided equally by property
holders on either side of the road, including the Road
Commission, the City, the County and private owners.
4. On the east side of the road the owners of the
property, who will benefit from this sewage line, are the
Road Commission Maintenance Area, the City of Tooele
and the County of Tooele in approximately equal tracts.
Their joint share of one-half of the construction cost of
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$3,525.00 is $1,762.50. The Road Commission's share of
this amount is $587.50. This amount ($587.50) plus the
cost of connection aforementioned ($577.00) adds to the
sum of $1,164.50 which represents the total cost to the
Road Commission. Deducting the Road Commission's
total cost of $1,164.50 from the total contract cost of
$4,102.00 leaves $2,937.50, which is to be returned to the
Road Commission from private owners and Local Governments in the following proportions:
Tooele County ·--··--·---·----------------$ 587.50
Tooele City ·------------------------------- 587.50
Private Owners ·-··----·----------------- 1,762.50
$2,937.50
5. Connections to the sewer line by ten (10) private
individuals will be authorized at the rate of $176.25 per
building unit, payable in advance for each connection.
No such connection will be authorized without prior approval of a duly authorized representative of the State
Highway Department. When the full amount advanced
by the Road Commission, less the connection charge and
prorated charge has been repaid to the Road Commission,
the entire system will become the property of the City of
Tooele as a part of the City's system. The City shall have
the right to pay the full amount owing prior to the retirement of the total construction cost, if the City desires
to acquire full ownership of the sewer system.

*

*

*

*

*

6. The Road Commission agrees with the City of
Tooele to extend the water line 840 feet along Coleman
Street, at
estimated cost of $2,500.00 to service the
junction opposite the State Highway Maintenance Area
with a 6-inch pipe, rather than the 2-inch pipe minimum
size for State hi;;hway usage only. To compensate for
the improvement in the City of Tooele's property to the
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water line, the City agrees to assist in the construction
thereof using its equipment.
7. As provided above 1 for the extension uf the sewer
line, the City will have the right to connect City property
to the water line. Connections for use of private individuals will be authorized at the rate of $125.00 per building unit until the sum of $1,250.00 has been paid to the
State Highway Department. When this sum has Leen
paid, the 6-inch water main will become a part of the
City's water system, and ownership and administration of
sanw shall pass to the City. As in the case of the sewage
system, the City may pay the unpaid balance of the
$1,250.00 at any time the City may desire to acquire full
ownership of this water system.
IN WITNErSS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have
hereunto set their hands and seals the day and year first
above written."
From the contract itself we get the following stipulations:
The State Road Commission, Tooele City, and Tooele
County, owned property abutting Coleman Street in
Tooele City. Private individuals also owned property
abutting said street. The Road Commission and Tooele
County desired sewer and water service from Tooele City
to service their properties. This required an extension of
the City's sewer and water mains along Coleman Street
some 1168 feet for the sewer line and 840 feet for the
water line. Tooele City did not have the fundR available
to pay for the installation of these lines. A contract was
entered into February 1, 1962, between the Road Commission, Tooele County, and Tooele City, a copy of which
is attached to the pleadings. Under this agreement

6

Road Commission agreed to advance the cost of such
installation, $4,102.00 for the sewer line and $2,500.00
for the water line. The City agreed to dig and back fill
the trench for the water line. It was agreed to install
an 8 inch sewer pipe line rather than a 6 inch pipe lin1\
and a 6 inch water pipe line rather than a 2 inch pipe line
to provide a capacity that would permit adjoining landowners to connect to the sewer line and water line thus
extended. Of the cost of installing the sewer pipe line,
the Road Commission agreed to pay a connection fee. of
$577.00 to connect its property to the sewer line, leaving
a balance of the cost of installing the sewer line, $3,525.00,
to be divided equally by the property owners on either
side of the street, including the Road Commi8sion, the
City, the County, and private owners.
It was further agreed that the Road Commission,
Tooele County and Tooele City each owned approximately equal tracts of land on the east side of the street, and
their joint shares of one half the construction cost of
$3,525.00 totaled $1,762.50. The construction cost was
reduced by the $577.00 which the Road Commission
agreed to pay as a connection fee. The Road Commission's one-third share of $1,762.50 was $587.50. This
added to the $577.00 connection fee made $1,164.50, the
total cost to the Road Commission, which subtracted
from the total cost of $4,102.00 leaves $2,937.50 to be
repaid to the Road Commission by private owners and
the County and City. Of this amount, Tooele County
and Tooele City were to pay $587.00 each, the same as
the Road Commission, and private owners $1,7G2.:50.
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This $1,762.50 balance of the cost of installation of
the sewer line should be charged equally for connections
to ten lots, $176.25 per building unit. The sewer line was
to become the property of Tooele City upon payment to
the Road Commission of the amount of the construction
cost advanced over and above the amount assumed by the
Road Commission. This balance could be paid by Tooele
City at any time.
1

As to the water line it is agreed that the City and
private individuals would connect thereto and that one
half of the $2,500.00 cost of installation, or $1,250.00 was
to be paid at the rate of $125.00 per building unit, that
the sum of $1,250.00 is to be paid to the Road Commission. Upon the payment of this sum the water line will
become a part of the City's water system, and ownership
and administration of same shall go to the City. The City
can pay the same at any time.
The pleadings show that Appellant became the owner
of the ten lots referred to in the agreement in 1968, after
the execution of the agreement. At the time the agreement was executed, Tooele City had an ordinance which
provided for a sewer connection fee of $30.00 and a water
connection fee of $125.00. Thereafter on April 11, 1966,
the City adopted an amendment to this ordinance, raising
the sewer connection fee for a 4-inch sewer connection
to $200.00, and water connection fee remaining the same,
$125.00 for each % inch connection.
Appellant attempted to obtain a connection to the
sewer line thus installed, first for 7 of his lots on March
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20, 1968, then for G of his lots on March 26, 19GS, tendering only the sum of $17G.25 for the sewer connection and
$125.00 for the water connection as provided in the contract. On March 26, 1968, the respondent reimbursed the
Road Commission in full. Appellant was refused the connections applied for, for the reason that he did not pay
or tender the connection fees provided for by the ordinance then in force, $200.00 for a sewer connection and
$125.00 for a water connection. On May 7, 1968, appellant
paid under protest to respondent $376.25 for a connection
to the sewer for one of his lots, being the amount called
for by the contract, plus the amount required by the City
ordinance. Again on April 8, 1969, he paid under protest
like sums for sewer and water connections for another lot.

Later in May, 1969, he brought this action to recover
the sum of $650.00 as being the amount paid in excess
of the amount required under the contract, and for a
judgment directing the respondent to permit sewer and
water connections for the amounts fixed under contract
and for $10,000.00 punitive damages.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT WAS RIGHT IN HOLDING THAT
THE COSTS PROVIDED IN THE WRITTEN CONTRACT
WERE ONLY FOR INSTALLATION EXPENSES AND NOT
CONNECTION FEES UNDER THE CITY ORDINANCES.

It is clear from the contract itself that the parties
thereto were contracting only for the cost of installing

t'xtensions to the City's sewer and water main system
along Coleman Street. rrhere was no occasion for involving the connection charges prescribed by the City
ordinances in coming to an agreement respecting the cost
of installation of the sewer and water main extension. As
a matter of law the parties could not by contract eliminate the provisions of the ordinances. Reduced to its
simplest tenns, the contract was entered into because
the City did not have the funds with which to make the
extensions and the Road Commission agreed to advance
the cost and receive later a refund of the amount they
advanced above that which it was to pay to have its proprrty connected to the 1City's sewer system and water
system.
The contract itself makes a distinction between what
is called a "connection fee" and the cost of installation
of the lines which is to be returned to the Road Commission. Paragraph 3 provides for the payment of a connection fee of $577.00, for connecting the Road Commission maintenance, area to the sewer lines. Paragraph 4
divides up the cost of the construction between the Road
Commission, the County, the City, and the private owners.
It gives the Road Commission credit for the "contr1Jection
fee" of $577.00 provided for in paragraph 3, and fixes the
construction cost at $3,525.00 which is then divided,
$587.00 to the Road Commission and the balance of $2,937.50 between the City, County, and private landowners.
Paragraph 5 divides the cost allocated. to the private
ownrrs, $1,762.50, in paragraph 4, equally between 10
private owners, who would be permitted to connect to
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the sewer exte'.ns-i0'11 so far as the Road Commission was
concerned by paying $176.25 per building lot, thus assuring the Road Commission the refund of $1,762.50. This
sum is not denominated a connection fee. The paragraph
simply permits the private owners to connect upon paying
this part of the money advanced by the Road Commission
to pay the cost of construction. However, the Road Commission looked to the City for the refund of this part of
the cost.
There is no magic in the use of the word "connection"
as asserted by appellant in his brief, to compel the conclusion that the city ordinance imposing a connection fee
was in any way involved in the contract or was being
obviated by the
The contract covers only the
cost of construction to be advanced by, and the part to be
returned to, the Road Commission, recognizing, however,
that the Road Commission was required to pay a cort>nection fee as well as its part of the cost of construction.
The ·same is true of the water line. The cost was
estimated at $2,500.00 to be advanced by the· Road Commission. The City was to furnish its equipment to have
a 6 inch pipe line that would service ·all the property
along the street instead· of a 2 inch line to service only
the Road Commission property. The
fixes
half the cost, or $1,250.00, as the amount to be repaid to
the Road Commission by the land owners, at the rate of
$125.00 per connection. This has nothing to do with the
connection fee fixed by the City ordinance. It relates only
to the refunding of the money advanced by the Road
1
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Commission to install the water line. Here again the Road
Commission looked to the City to make their reimbursement.
We quote from 10 McQuillin, Section 29.117:
"In construing a municipal contract, the construction which will best effectuate the intention
of the parties as expressed therein should be given.
. . . The court assumes that the parties intended an
enforceable contract, and if the agreement is susceptible of different constructions, will adopt the
one which will render the contract lawful. . . .
Public contract will be liberally construed in favor
of the public."
Section 29.116:
"If the language of a contract is unambiguous, its construction is a matter of law for the
court."

Section 29.07 :

"No part of any
conferred upon the
corporation cari be transferred or delegated to
other persons; nor can th:e city or town through
its officers grant away by contract or otherwise
to private corporations or individuals the
authority to control the powers and functions
properly appertaining to · the municipal government." . . . "The established rule is that municipal corporations have no power to make contracts which will embarrass or control them in
the performance of their legislative powers and
duties. Accordingly, the law is well settled that
a city cannot by contract deprive itself of any of
its legislative powers, or governmental powers,"
... "So, power conferred upon a city to contract
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respecting a particular matter does not confer
power, by implication, so to contract with reference thereto as to embarrass and interfere with
its future control over the matter, as the public
interests may require. Hence, all contracts which
interfere with the legislative or governmental
functions of the municipality are absolutely void."
Section 24.04:
"The municipal corporation cannot bind itself
in any contract which is beyond the scope of its
powers, or foreign to the purposes for which it
was created, or which is forbidden by law, or
against public policy, and all persons contracting
with the corporation are deemed to know its
limitations in these respects."
Section 29.04 is cited in Thatcher Chemical Co. V.
Salt Lake City, 21 Utah 2d 333, 445 P2d 769, wherein the
court said;
"Every person contracting with a municipal
corporation, or one who proposes to enter into a
contract with such coporation, is bound to take
notice of the provisions of the city ordinances and
any limitations therein contained."
In McQuillin, Section 15.14, p. 73 it said:
"A contract made in contravention of an
ordinance has been held to be void."
In 5 McQuillan, Section 19.42, p. 504 the author states:
"The laws which subsist at the time and place
of making a contract enter into and form a part
of it, as much so as if such laws were
referred to and incorporated in its terms. This
rule applies equally to laws, whether they affect
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the validity, construction, discharge, or enforcement of contracts."
10 McQuillan, Section 29.91, p. 458:
"A municipal corporation cannot enter into
contracts which curtail or prohibit an exercise
of its legislative or administrative authority."
Under the foregoing authorities, Tooele City had no
power to enter into a contract that would ignore its
ordinances or that would give to appellent greater rights
than those accorded to the residents of the city generally.
rro construe the contract here involved as advocated by
appellant would make the contract void. The court will
not so construe it when it is subject to a construction
that would make it legal.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS IN ITS FAVOR, IN DISMISSING THE
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT.

As we have heretofore shown the contract here
involved was not, and legally could not, be intended to
override the city's ordinances and provide that it covered
all connection charges. The contract and the intention of
the parties thereto are plain and clear. No parol evidence
could possibly be adduced that would in any manner
bring ahout the intention and meaning contended by
tlw am1ellant.
As stated in 13 McQuillin Section 37.130:
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"In accordance with well settled general rules
of the law of evidence, parol evidence is inadmissable to alter, explain, contradict, or add to
the contract (public improvement contract) in
the absence of fraud, accident or mistake" ...
"The contract is to be so construed as to
sustain its' validity when the language will permit.
And where
is doubt as to interpretation, the
contract will be interpreted in favor of the
public."
'

'

As soon as plaintiff connected his property to the
sewer a.nd water extensions he automatically connected
to the city's sewer and water systems regardless of
whether_ the city in a strict legal sense had ownership of
'
these extensions. He would receive water from the city's
water system and would dispose of his sewage through
the city's sewer system. The connection fee imposed by
the city is for the privilege of the connection and service
thus obtained. It is, therefore, immaterial, as· far as
plaintiff is concerned, ·whether the city actually owned
legal title to the extension· lines by not having reimbursed the road commission at the time plaintiff first
made application for connection$. .Clearly the city and
road. commission were not contracting with regard to
the connection fees imposed by the city's. ordiillances to
give. a particular landowner an exemption from complying with such ordinances.
'

1

While the contract provides that· upon payment to
the Road Commission of the amount to be refunded to it,
the sewer and water lines were to become the property
of the City and part, of its sewer. and water. system, such
1
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contractual provision could not in any manner affect or
restrict the ciy in exercising its control and ,administration of its sewer and water systems, or prevent it from
imposing connection fee in addition to the construction
cost upon persons connecting thereto. As soon as the
sewer and water lines were laid and connected to the
city's systems, they became an integral part of those
systems regardless of whether the Roiad Commission
had been reimbursed for the money it advanced. For the
law is clear that the city may not contract away any of its
rights in its streets.
In 11 McQuillin Section 31.09, p. 193, it is said:
"One who builds a private sewer in a public
street with the city's permission, it has been held,
does not own the sewer. A city, :i:t has been said,
cannot give away its rights in public streets."
In Cornwall v. Garrison, 59 Ida. 287, 81 Pac. 1094,
a sewer was constructed in a public street of Moscow,
Idaho, at the expense of a school district. The properly
of the school district
acquired by . plaintiff who
brought a suit against defendant to restrain him from
connectrng to the sewer. No permit was granted by the
city to construct the sewer in the street. The· court decided
in favor of the defendant. It cites A.&D.S Realty
Corporation v. Kass, 119 Misc. 735, 197 NYS 279, where
a sewer line had been installed with the city's permission
at plaintiff's expense. Plaintiff brought suit to prevent
defrndant from using the sewer on the theory he owned
it. Court says, as quoted by the Idaho Court:
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"Plaintiff seeks to prevent defendants from
using the sewer. But plaintiff has no right to it.
Even when it was built the pl aintiff did not own
the sewer. It was constructed in a public street
and not in property belonging o plaintiff. The
city could not give away its rights in the public
streets.''
1

In City of Shawnee v. Thompson, Okla., 275 P. 2nd 323,
Thompson obtained permission of the city to construct
a sewer line in a public street to service his property
outside the city limits. His property wa,s annexed and he
brought suit in reverse condemnation to recover the
costs of constructing the sewer in the amount of
$16,764.96. The court said:
"The permission given by the city to plaintiff to build the sewer line did not give plaintiff
a franchise for the use of the city streets for a
private sewer. The City cannot give away its
rights in the public streets. The sewer here
consttructed was intended to be and did become
an integral part of the city system, used by
residents in Capps Addition as well as by residents
in plaintiff's addition. It is against public policy
to permit private persons to acquire or retain a
proprietary interes t in public sanitary sewer
line:s. Such ownership or interest would condition
the rights of public authorities to exercise
control thereof and to extend to others equally
entitled to sewer service permission to connect
with such sewers."
1

Cites Cornwall v. Garrison, supra, and A.&D.S. Realty
Corp. v. Karr, supra.
The court further states:
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"Since this sewer lLne, even though constructed and paid for by plaintiff, was a public
sewer and an integral part of the city sewer
system and plaintiff does not have and never had
any ownership therof, he cannot recover damages
in reverse condemn ation against the city for the
taking of his property for a public use."
1

In 11 McQuillim, Section 31.09, it is said:
"In some cases private sewer lines are
regarded as becoming municipal lines merely
through connection and integration in the latter",
citing City of Shawnee v. Thompson, supra, and Clive
v. Red Bank Utility Dist. 194 Tenn. 255, 250 SW 2d 362.
The contract here involved clearly contemplated that
both the sewer extension and the water extension were
to become an integral part of the city's sewer and water
system. The Road Commission was not to pay the entire
cost. The City, County and landowners were to pay a
proportionate share of the cost and thereby reimburse
the Road Commission for the money it advanced. When
the extensions were connected with the city's systems
they became an integral part of the city's systems.
The city could not contract with the Road Commis'sion
that the latter should retain title and control the administration of these extensions, and especially could not,
and did 'not, contract that its ordinances governing
connections to its systems should be disregarded and
overruled or held in abeyance.
As stated in 11 McQuillin, Section 31.09;
"Individuals who connect their houses v,rith
and empty their sewage into a system of sewers
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maintained by a municipality or a public service
corporation, are bound to pay 'a charge therefor
as ordinarily the privilege is not an easement
annexed or appurtenant to the land."
In Murray City v. Board of Education, 16 Utah 2d
115, 395 P2d 628, the court siaid :

"It (the city) can require connection to the
sewer to protect the health of its citizens as a
functioning municipality and it can impose
charges for sewage treatment and disposal as a
sewage district. The conclusion must follow that
the service charge and connection charge, neither
of which is challenged as unreasonable, are not
taxes or assessments, but payment for service
which the board of education enjoyed."
In 11 McQuillin, Section 31.30, p. 248, it is said:
"Sewer charges and fees are not taxes or
special assessments but are in the nature of tolls
or rents paid for services furnished or available
- Such fees and charges generally are distinct
and separate from construction .costs, although
where the statutes permit, they may be used in
whole or in part to defray construction costs and
expenses, or even for municipal purposes. The
right of a city to impose sewer fees, rents or like
charges, is. not affected by the fact that general
municipal tax funds have been used to construct,
or in prior years to maintain the sewers; nor by
the fact that the sewers were constructed by a
dedicator before the city had control of them... ·
The amount of the connection fee may be
changed."

It is well to bear in mind that there is in our case
no question of ambiguity as to the meaning of the con-
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tract as between the parties to the contract. That
question is raised only by plaintiff who is not a party
to the contract. There is no ambiguity as to the meaning
of the contract as between the parties thereto. This court
in Ephraim The atre Company v. Hawk, 7 Utah 2d 163,
321 P.2d 221, said that certain fundamental concepts
should be kept in mind rn regard to contracts, siaying:
1

"That their purpose is to reduce to writing
the conditions upon which the minds of the parties
have met and to fix their rights and duties with
respect thereto. The intent so expressed is to be
found, if possible, within the four corners of the
instrument itself in accordance with the ordinary
accepted meaning of the words used. Unless there
is ambiguity or uncertainty in the language so the
meaning is confused, or is susceptible of more
than one meaning, there is no justification for interpretation or explanation from extraneous
sources. It would defeat the very purpose of
formal contracts to permit a party to invoke the
use of words or conduct inconsistent with its
terms to prove that the parties did not mean what
they said, or to use such inconsistent words or
conduct to demonstrate uncertainty or ambiguity
where none would otherwise exist."
Here plaintiff is attempting to apply to the words
"connection " "connection fee " and "connected" some
'
'
kind of ambiguity that is not in any manner indicated in
the contract between the parties thereto themselves. The
parties were not contracting, and could not contract, with
reference to the connection fees required by the city ordinances. They were contracting merely with reference to
the payment back to the Road Commission of a part of
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the cost of installing the sewer and water extensions
which the Road Commission advanced.
"The use of a term susceptible of two or more
meanings does not necesarily make the meaning
of the sentence in which it appears ambiguous or
doubtful." In re Piries Estate, 116 Vt. 159, 71 A2d
245.
In Ullman v. Chicago & N. W. Ry Co., 112 Mich. 150,
88 NW 41, p. 45, the court says :
"Judicial eonstruction of a contract does not
reach a point where the meaning of some significant word can be said to be in doubt and it is
permissible to assign thereto one of two meanings
either of which is within the reasonable scope
thereof, upon merely arriving at a conclusion that
such word may, as an abstract proposition, ba
given either of two meanings. A word in a coilitract, taken by itself, often admits of two mear1
ings, when, from the whole contract to be construed, there is no reasonable doubt a:s to the
sense in which the parties used it. In that situation, the particular sense they ascribed to the word
when the contract was made must be adopted if it
is within the reasonable scope thereof. That satisfies clearness in such a contract as the, one before
us. - If mere ambiguity of expression were always taken as justifying a court in choosing between two meanings of a particular word, or collection of words, either of which is within the
reasonable scope thereof, the primary purpose of
judicial construction - that of determining the
intention of the parties in regard to the reasonable
meaning of the language they chose to use-would
often fail of accomplishment. There is often ambiguity of expression in 'a written contract or other
1
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writing when the meaning is plain, leaving no
room for a selection to be made between the two
meanings for the purpose of arriving at the intention of the parties thereto.''

In Whiting Stoker Co. v. Chicago Stoker Corporation, 171 Fed. 2d 248, the court said:
"A contract is ambiguous if, and only if, it is
reasonably or fairly susceptible of different constructions ; it is not ambiguous if the court can
determine its meaning without any guide other
than a knowledge of the simple facts on which,
from the nature of the language in general, its
meaning depends.
"A possibility of doubt is not sufficient, for
it is out of such possibilities that controversies
arise. It is the duty of the court to ascertain by
judicial interpretation, not whether a doubt may
be asserted, but whether any 1ambiguity really exists. - Ultimately the question whether an ambiguity exists is to be determined by the court as a
question of law."
There are no issues of fact to be tried in this case.
All pertinent facts were before the court in the pleadings.
The disposition of the case depended entirely upon the
construction to be given to the contract, whether it was
intended to supersede and avoid the existing city ordinances with reference to connection fees to be paid for
a connection to the sewer and water system of the city,
and thus give a preferential right to plaintiff's ten lots, or
whether the contract related only to the payment of construci on costs so far as these ten lots were concerned.
No parol evidence could assist the court in deciding that
que'stion.
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Plaintiff is not being charged twice for the construction costs. Under Section 10-7-21, Utah Code Annotated
'
1953, cities are empowered to construct sewers. Under
Section 20-7-22, cities may assess the abutting property
to defray the cost of the construction. Under Section
10-8-38, a city may impose a reasonable charge for the
use of its sewer system to provide for the cost of construction, reconstruction, maintenance or operation of a
sewer system. The cost of construction in this case was
fixed by the city at $176.25 per lot, which amount could
have been assessed against each lot. In addition it could
make a charge for the maintenance and operation of its
sewer system. There is no question raised in this case
. as to the reasonableness of this charge for the cost of
construction as to either the sewer line or the water line.
In this case the sewer connection fee was raised by ordinance to bear the cost of enlarging the sewage disposal
plant. This the city had a right to do. Murray City v.
.Board of Education, supra.
Under Section 10-7-14 Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
the city is empowered to fix water connection fees, as a
part of the general power granted by said section.
CONCLUSION
Defendant respectfully submits that the only proper
construction that can be given to the contract here involved is that it was intended only to cover the cost of
constructing the sewer line and water line extensions. The
contract was not intended to supersede, avoid or in any
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manner affect the application of the defendant's ordinances with respect to connection fees to be paid to connect to its sewer 'and water systems. To construe the
contract as contended for by plaintiff would render it
illegal and void.
·Defendant respectfully submits that the judgment of
the lower court was correct and should be affirmed.
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